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Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion:  A Tale of Two 
Approaches to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online 
Stacey Dogan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, courts have developed two distinct approaches in 
evaluating trademark claims against online intermediaries.  The first and most 
common method frames the issue as one of secondary liability:  should the 
intermediary face liability for wrongdoing committed by its advertisers, 
subscribers, or other users of its services?  In this approach, courts struggle with the 
tension between preserving legitimate, non-infringing uses of technologies on the 
one hand, and minimizing infringement on the other.  While no clear doctrinal 
consensus has formed, courts are converging on a framework centered on specific 
knowledge, reasonable response and inducement—principles derived from 
trademark law but mirroring their counterparts in copyright.1 
At the same time, some opinions have suggested a different form of trademark 
liability focused on the intermediary’s choices in designing services that use—or 
allow others to use—trademarks in various ways.2  Though branded as direct 
trademark infringement, the doctrine bears little resemblance to historical direct 
infringement law.  Instead, it resembles a roving unfair competition law, leaving 
discretion with the fact finder to assess the intermediary’s culpability in enabling 
confusion.3  Because the likelihood-of-confusion factors map poorly onto such an 
inquiry,4 this form of direct infringement has no clear doctrinal framework.  Nor 
have courts articulated a coherent normative vision to guide lower courts in shaping 
and applying the law.  Most troubling, the scant case law has paid little attention to 
issues at the core of secondary liability analysis—namely, the need to strike a 
balance between infringing and non-infringing uses, and the worry that liability 
might threaten legitimate uses of trademarks that enhance competition and increase 
consumer choice. 
If this mutant form of direct infringement is here to stay, courts must recognize 
it as a new cause of action, and must define its normative objectives with an eye to 
 
 * Professor and Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
 1. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1249–55 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103–10 (2d Cir. 2010); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 
676 F.3d 144, 163–65 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 2. See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 152–60; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129–
30 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 154–56. 
 4. See id. 
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both benefits and costs of judicial intervention.  Rather than balancing arguably 
relevant likelihood-of-confusion factors on an ad hoc basis, courts should devise a 
new set of considerations addressed specifically to intermediaries.  In particular, the 
law should distinguish between policies and practices that directly sow confusion,, 
and those whose only offense lies in creating an environment where counterfeiting, 
passing off or other forms of infringement can occur.  While the first type of 
behavior may justify direct liability, the second does not.  Instead, it resembles the 
“mixed-use” conduct that the Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against 
penalizing, because of potential collateral effects.5  Any rule of liability addressed 
to such conduct must take these effects into account; it should target deliberately 
harmful behavior, while protecting market actors’ ability to make non-infringing 
uses of trademarks and intermediaries’ right to help them.6 
Part I outlines some core principles that both justify and discipline the rules 
imposing liability for wrongs committed by others.  Most of these principles have 
surfaced in the copyright context, but they have salience for trademark law.  Part II 
describes the courts’ application of these principles in evaluating contributory 
trademark infringement claims against Internet intermediaries.  As their opinions 
make clear, contributory infringement doctrine is equipped to balance the rights of 
trademark holders against the public’s interest in making non-infringing uses of 
marks.  Courts may not get it right all the time, but the structure of secondary 
liability analysis provides a framework to balance the relevant interests.  Part III 
contrasts this nuanced, normatively grounded framework with the apparently ad 
hoc standards governing so-called direct infringement claims against 
intermediaries.  Because the direct infringement opinions are scarce and under-
analyzed, however, there is much room for development. 
I.  GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Trademark law has a long history of imposing liability against defendants for 
infringement by related parties.7  The Supreme Court most recently addressed the 
issue in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., a suit seeking to hold 
a pharmaceutical company liable for the behavior of pharmacists who had passed 
off its generic product as a famous brand-name drug.8  Citing precedent from the 
early 1900s, the Court confirmed that parties can face liability for infringement 
 
 5. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435–42 (1984); Henry 
v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912), overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917); cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932–37 (2005) (noting that the staple article of commerce doctrine 
announced in Sony “provides breathing room for innovation and vigorous commerce”). 
 6. Cf. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?  The Implications of Sony for Napster and Other 
Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 943 (2001) [hereinafter Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?] (“At 
its core, Sony is about preventing copyright holders from interfering with consumers’ ability to make 
non-infringing uses of technology.”). 
 7. For a fuller discussion of this history, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1675–82 (2007). 
 8. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 849–50 (1982). 
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committed by others: 
[L]iability can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of 
another.  Even if a manufacturer does not directly control others in the chain of 
distribution, it can be held responsible for their infringing activities under certain 
circumstances.  Thus, if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or 
has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or 
distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.9 
While Inwood offered a relatively straightforward rule for contributory liability, 
it was frustratingly short on normative content.  The court of appeals in that case 
had misapplied the relevant standard of review, so the Court reversed without 
analyzing the substantive claims or defenses.10  As a result, we are left with the 
Court’s unadorned statement of black-letter law, with little sense of the goals or 
limits of contributory infringement doctrine in trademark law. 
Despite its absence in Inwood, however, normative guidance has emerged from 
judicial and legislative developments in other areas of intellectual property law.  In 
particular, the legal response to infringement-enabling technologies in copyright 
law has produced a cluster of normative values to govern secondary infringement 
analysis.  While one could classify these values in various ways, they generally 
seek to avoid interference, deter intentional wrongs and encourage responsibility in 
dealings with direct infringers. 
A.  NON-INTERFERENCE 
The non-interference principle dictates that indirect liability rules should seek a 
balance between providing effective relief to intellectual property holders and 
avoiding interference with legitimate commerce.11  It recognizes that suits against 
parties other than direct infringers sometimes provide the only meaningful avenue 
for relief, either because the related parties are in the best position to prevent the 
harm or because a direct infringement suit would be impracticable or ineffective.12  
The notion of related-party liability is neither new nor unique to intellectual 
property:  “[V]icarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the 
 
 9. Id. at 853–54. 
 10. In addition to the standard for contributory liability, Inwood raised important questions about 
trademark’s functionality doctrine.  See id. at 851, 853, 857. 
 11. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 12. Id. at 442 (finding that indirect copyright liability “is grounded on the recognition that 
adequate protection of a monopoly may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device 
or publication to the products or activities that make such duplication possible”); id. (noting that 
secondary liability ensures “effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly”); 
see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) (“When a 
widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to . . . effectively 
[target] all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor . . . for 
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious liability.”); Shapiro, Berstein & Co. v. H.L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding copyright liability appropriate against the party in 
the best position to police the behavior of the direct infringer). 
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concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of 
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable 
for the actions of another.”13 
At the same time, broad secondary liability rules come with costs.  In particular, 
if liability turns on acts or product sales that enable both lawful and unlawful 
conduct, it may chill or increase the costs of legitimate behavior.  In Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., for example, a group of copyright holders 
sued a VCR manufacturer, claiming that the technology enabled home users to 
make infringing copies of television programs.14  Drawing from patent law, the 
Court noted that product-based contributory infringement claims could limit the 
public’s ability to put the product to lawful, socially productive use: 
When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an 
article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public 
interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated.  A finding of 
contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article from the market 
altogether; it does, however, give the patentee effective control over the sale of that 
item.  Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional 
equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly granted to the 
patentee.15 
To avoid undue burden on non-infringing markets, the Sony Court adopted the 
“staple article of commerce” doctrine from patent law, holding that the sale of 
products used for infringement cannot constitute contributory copyright 
infringement as long as the product has a “substantial non-infringing use.”16 
Although Sony disavowed any direct connection to trademark law,17 the opinion 
holds lessons for related-party liability in trademark.  First, it reflects the need for 
balance in crafting secondary liability rules, not only in intellectual property, but in 
other areas of law as well.  While laws may—and often should—reach actors who 
do not directly commit the act defined as a violation, sensitivity to the law’s effects 
on legitimate behavior is important.  Indeed, Sony suggests a presumption against 
liability when the defendant is enabling significant lawful behavior that would be 
threatened by a ruling against it.18  Second, the Court’s disavowal of trademark’s 
rules is itself relevant to the appropriate balance in trademark law.  The Court 
declined to turn to trademark law for guidance because of trademark law’s 
 
 13. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435.  See generally Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-
Party Trademark Infringement, 2011 STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 10, available at http://journals.law. 
stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review-stlr/online/mckenna-probabilistic-
knowledge.pdf; Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in 
Amazon and Visa, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 513 (2009). 
 14. Sony, 464 U.S. at 417. 
 15. Id. at 440–41. 
 16. Id. at 442. 
 17. Id. at 439 n.19. 
 18. Cf. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR?, supra note 6, at 950–51 (contending that Sony allows liability 
if the defendant could effectively prevent the infringement while preserving non-infringing uses of its 
service or technology). 
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narrower scope relative to patent or copyright.19  Thus, if anything, courts should 
be more hesitant to impose trademark liability in mixed-use cases, i.e., in suits 
based on behavior that enables both infringing and non-infringing conduct.20 
Because Sony involved the one-time sale of goods, however, it left open the 
question of how to treat defendants whose acts facilitate infringement or who have 
a continuing relationship with infringers.  Since the emergence of the Internet, the 
lower courts, the Supreme Court and Congress have moved toward a set of rules to 
govern those contexts. 
B.  CULPABILITY 
Taken at face value, Sony could plausibly immunize any defendant whose 
behavior or technology has non-infringing applications, regardless of whether the 
defendant’s core business model centered on promoting infringement.  Indeed, in 
the early days of the Internet, defendants relied on Sony’s “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine to argue against liability for any Internet-based service that 
had substantial non-infringing uses.21  In MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the 
Supreme Court put an end to that notion, at least for defendants whose 
contributions to infringement were deliberate, rather than tangential to a legitimate 
motive.22  Grokster involved a peer-to-peer file sharing service that had many legal 
uses but whose primary use (and apparent purpose) was to facilitate the sharing of 
copyrighted songs and music.23  The Supreme Court found Sony inapplicable, 
reasoning that “the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability 
derived from the common law.”24  The Court crafted a new doctrine of copyright 
inducement, applicable against parties who distribute a product “with the object of 
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”25 
Like Sony, Grokster reflects normative principles that can be generalized to 
 
 19. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (describing Inwood as a “narrow standard for contributory 
trademark infringement,” under which the claims in Sony “would merit little discussion”); see also 
Clearline Techs. Ltd. v. Cooper B-Line, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614  n.10 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (citing 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19) (describing secondary liability in trademark law as narrower than 
copyright); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).  This 
narrower conception of trademark infringement is not an accident, but reflects the fact that trademark 
law does not convey any exclusive right to copy or otherwise use trademarks, but instead provides a 
more limited right to prevent others from using marks in ways that confuse—or more recently, dilute—
the distinctiveness of famous marks.  Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (listing exclusive rights of 
copyright owners), with 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (c) (2012) (trademark infringement and dilution standards, 
which turn on misinformation or dilution through tarnishment or blurring). 
 20. See generally Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 806 (“The tests for secondary trademark infringement 
are even more difficult to satisfy than those required to find secondary copyright infringement.”). 
 21. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2001); In re 
Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647–53 (7th Cir. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160–62 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 22. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 914. 
 23. Id. at 913. 
 24. Id. at 934–35. 
 25. Id. at 936–37. 
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apply to other areas of third-party liability, including trademark law.  For one thing, 
it validates the notion of culpability, i.e., that parties who intentionally help 
someone to commit a wrong are legally responsible for the violation, even if their 
actions also enable lawful conduct.26  But of equal importance, Grokster defines 
culpability narrowly to include only defendants with specific intent to achieve the 
infringing outcome.27  Parties that proceed with knowledge—even certainty—that 
some people may put their product to illicit use are shielded by the Sony safe 
harbor.  The Court invoked Sony’s non-interference principle explicitly: 
We are, of course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on regular commerce or 
discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.  
Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge 
of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of 
infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a 
distributor to liability.  . . .  The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on 
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise 
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.28 
Grokster’s fault-based doctrine thus reaffirms the core lesson of Sony:  that 
merely providing tools for infringement cannot justify liability, as long as those 
tools also have lawful application.  That rule, moreover, is no mere technicality, but 
reflects a normative commitment to protecting “legitimate commerce” against 
interference by intellectual property owners.  The Court made clear that the non-
interference principle continues to protect parties who happen to enable 
infringement through otherwise innocuous behavior—even when those parties 
know that some infringement will result.  Grokster’s inducement doctrine applies 
only if the intent is to promote infringement. 
Admittedly, the inducement rule announced in Grokster leaves broad discretion 
with the fact finder to distinguish between lawful and illicit motives.  In Grokster 
itself, for example, the Supreme Court found evidence of inducement based largely 
on indirect evidence of the defendants’ unlawful intent,29 and subsequent lower 
court opinions have adopted a similar “we know it when we see it” approach.30  As 
 
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (outlining rules for contributory 
tortfeasors); see also Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
184, 232–38 (2006) (noting that tort law defines “intent,” in context of intentional torts, to include 
acting:  (1) “with the express purpose of causing harm”; or (2) with “substantial certainty” that harm will 
result to a particular individual as a result of the behavior); cf. United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 
1371 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Aiding and abetting a misapplication of bank funds occurs when a bank 
employee misapplies bank funds and the defendant knows of the bank’s substantive offense and acts 
with intent to further it.”) (emphasis added). 
 27. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (noting that inducement requires “an affirmative intent that the 
product be used to infringe”). 
 28. Id. at 937 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id.at 937−40 (describing the evidence supporting a finding of inducement, which included 
defendants’ decision to target former Napster users, their failure to adopt filtering technologies and the 
enhanced advertising revenues due to the availability of infringing files). 
 30. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1035−36 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(finding inducement based on evidence similar to the evidence in Grokster, including enhanced 
advertising revenue as a result of infringement).  See generally Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We 
(2) 37.4 DOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2014  2:44 PM 
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Alfred Yen has pointed out, however, by creating an outlet for courts to punish 
intentional wrongdoers, Grokster arguably provides breathing space for other 
parties whose products and services have both infringing and non-infringing 
applications.31 
C.  REASONABLENESS IN OPERATION 
With Sony insulating one-time sellers of mixed-use products and Grokster 
condemning those who act with a purpose of infringement, the final principle of 
secondary liability grapples with the obligations of parties who act with neutral 
motives, but whose ongoing relationships with users give them the power to reduce 
or eliminate infringement as it occurs.  The guidance here has come from Congress 
and the lower courts,32 which have converged on a framework that essentially 
requires reasonableness in responding to specific notices of infringement.33  
Mindful of Sony, the law stops short of dictating technology design choices or 
defining liability by relation to risk creation.  As a result, intermediaries need not 
anticipate and head off infringement ex ante.  Yet the commitment to non-
interference does not rule out liability altogether where a defendant lacks intent to 
infringe.  Liability can result if a defendant either blinds itself to infringement or 
fails to take reasonable efforts to respond to notice of infringement.34 
The “reasonableness” principle seems—albeit implicitly—to pursue a modified 
best-cost-avoider strategy:35  it places responsibility for infringement detection and 
elimination with the party best positioned to accomplish each task.  Detection falls 
on the intellectual property owner, who is best suited to recognize unauthorized 
versions of its work or trademark.36  Responsibility for terminating the 
 
See It”:  Intermediary Trademark Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7 (2011) 
[hereinafter Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”]. 
 31. Yen, supra note 26, at 192 (“[I]nducement gives courts a new tool for holding culpable 
defendants liable while reducing the risk of undesirable side effects.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 33. “Reasonableness,” of course, is a charged and contested term in the law.  Compare, e.g., 
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 312 
(1996) (distinguishing between rationality (the instrumental pursuit of self-interest) and reasonableness 
(“restrain[ing] our pursuit of self-interest by acting in accordance with principles that fix fair terms of 
cooperation”)), with Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (defending 
the reasonableness standard in tort law as designed to incentivize efficient resource allocation).  At this 
point, I do not believe that the courts in intermediary cases are consciously pursuing any particular 
philosophical conception of “reasonableness.”  They are, however, grappling toward a contextual 
approach that requires intermediaries to respond to notice when it seems cost-effective and fair for them 
to do so. 
 34. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
 35. I call this a “modified” best-cost-avoider strategy because a pure best-cost-avoider approach 
would take system design into account and require intermediaries to take reasonable steps to head off 
infringement before it occurs; this modified form takes the technology as a given and deals only with 
questions of detection and response. 
 36. Courts have sometimes said this explicitly, but more often they have avoided the normative 
question and simply invoked Sony (or Inwood) for the notion that designers of technologies or services 
have no affirmative obligation to design their products to avoid infringement.  See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) 
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infringement, in turn, rests on the intermediary, assuming that it has specific 
knowledge and control over the means used to infringe.37  If the structure of a 
defendant’s system and its relationship to infringers gives it the power to stop 
known infringement without threatening lawful use, then the law requires it to 
exercise that power.38 
Doctrinally, this approach has emerged through common-law development of 
contributory infringement standards in copyright and trademark law,39 
complemented in copyright by the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).40  Both copyright and trademark law allow 
liability for parties that knowingly facilitate another party’s infringement.41  Sony 
and Grokster teach that design choices alone cannot result in liability under this 
standard, unless the technology either has no substantial non-infringing use or is 
coupled with a deliberate intent to cause infringement.42  As a result, much of the 
action in secondary liability cases occurs after the technology has launched, and 
consumers use it to infringe.43  Copyright and trademark holders charge 
intermediaries with contributory infringement because they purportedly “know” of 
 
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Certainly, the evidence adduced at trial 
failed to prove that eBay was a cheaper cost avoider than Tiffany with respect to policing its marks.  But 
even more importantly, even if it were true that eBay is best situated to staunch the tide of trademark 
infringement to which Tiffany and countless other rights owners are subjected, that is not the law.”); 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1022 (“Copyright holders know 
precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify infringing copies than 
service providers like Veoh, who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is 
not.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 38. Id. (noting question of fact as to “whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google 
to refrain from providing access to infringing images”).  Again, this principle is often implicit.  Courts 
channel their analyses through doctrinal standards of “knowledge” and “substantial assistance,” but the 
ultimate question is whether, given the intermediary’s knowledge of infringing acts and the tools at its 
disposal, it seems reasonable to require it to act on that knowledge.  See generally Dogan, Is Napster a 
VCR?, supra note 6.   
 39. Vicarious liability has played a more limited role, primarily in copyright.  Courts analyzing 
vicarious liability have shown a similar emphasis on context, with a core inquiry into whether the 
defendant acted reasonably in policing infringement in its system, in light of the system’s architecture.  
See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  The DMCA provides a “safe harbor” for intermediaries that 
implement a system for receiving notification of infringement and blocking access to infringing content 
that they learn of through that system.  See id. 
 41. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982) (stating that liability 
would turn on whether petitioners intentionally induced mislabeling by pharmacists); Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984) (“[T]he label ‘contributory infringement’ has 
been applied in a number of lower court copyright cases involving an ongoing relationship between the 
direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred.”). 
 42. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (“Sony 
barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the 
design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in 
fact used for infringement.”); id. at 939 n.12 (“Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a 
court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take 
affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1172–73. 
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infringement or counterfeiting behavior and fail to stop it.44  Courts thus have to 
decide two issues:  first, what level of “knowledge” satisfies the contributory 
infringement standard, and second, to what lengths must intermediaries go to 
eliminate the behavior? 
In addressing these questions, courts have taken a contextual, pragmatic 
approach that reflects reasonableness and modified best-cost-avoider principles.  
The approach dates back to the seminal opinion in Religious Technology Center v. 
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., which considered whether online 
service provider Netcom contributorially infringed by failing to remove 
copyrighted content after the copyright holder informed it of the posting.45  In 
everything from assessing the sufficiency of the notice to considering the service 
provider’s obligation to respond, the court asked whether the service provider acted 
reasonably.46  In analyzing notice, for example, the court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that only a formal copyright registration would suffice, but the court 
showed more sympathy for the idea that a plausible claim of fair use could defeat a 
showing of knowledge: 
Where a BBS [computer bulletin board service] operator cannot reasonably verify a 
claim of infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of 
copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder’s failure to provide the 
necessary documentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the operator’s 
lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability for 
contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its 
system.47 
Similarly, in deciding whether Netcom had “substantially participated” in its 
user’s infringement, the court considered the feasibility and fairness of requiring 
the intermediary to block the infringing content.48  The court found Netcom to be in 
a different position than a mere landlord, based on its ongoing role in enabling 
infringement and its ability to terminate it:  “[I]t is fair, assuming Netcom is able to 
take simple measures to prevent further damage to plaintiff’s copyrighted works, to 
hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement where Netcom has knowledge of 
Erlich’s infringing messages yet continues to aid in the accomplishment of Erlich’s 
purpose of publicly distributing the postings.”49  Netcom’s capabilities, in other 
words, required it to act, but only if it knew of the infringement and could stop it 
with  “simple measures” that would not interfere with its other operations. 
Intermediary copyright law has developed substantially since Netcom, and a 
substantial part of that development has been animated by the notion that 
intermediaries must act reasonably when they learn of infringement on their 
 
 44. See id.  
 45. Religious Tech. Ctr.  v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc, 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). 
 46. See id. at 1374. 
 47. Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 1375. 
 49. Id. 
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services.50  Admittedly, the law is not a model of clarity, and critics claim that legal 
uncertainty has chilled Internet innovation.51  What constitutes reasonable 
intermediary behavior, moreover, lies in the eye of the beholder.  Both courts and 
Congress, however, have embraced a modified best-cost-avoider approach:  to 
encourage intermediaries to share responsibility for responding to known 
infringement on their networks, without mandating ex ante policing, filtering or 
other preventative technology design.52  Intermediaries need not seek out 
infringement, but they must act when they obtain knowledge of specific infringing 
content.53  The DMCA, in particular, establishes a notice and takedown regime that 
limits liability for intermediaries that act promptly upon receiving knowledge of 
infringement.54 
The million-dollar question, of course, is what level and type of knowledge 
triggers an intermediary’s duty to act.  Courts appear to be moving toward a 
consensus on four points.  First, “knowledge” under the DMCA means specific 
knowledge of particular infringing content, rather than generalized awareness of 
infringement on the intermediary’s network.55  Second, such specific knowledge 
need not arise from formal, DMCA-compliant copyright notices; it can result from 
third-party communications or other “facts that would have made the specific 
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”56  Third, the under-
developed “willful blindness” doctrine forbids intermediaries from turning a blind 
eye and actively avoiding knowledge of infringement.57  And fourth, neither the 
 
 50. See also Conference Report on H.R. 2281, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. REP. NO. 
105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) [hereinafter DMCA Conference Report], available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt796/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt796.pdf (noting that the DMCA 
safe harbor “preserves strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to 
detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment”). 
 51. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, How the DMCA’s Online Copyright Safe Harbor Failed, TECH. & 
MARKETING L. BLOG (June 1, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/06/how-the-
dmcas-online-copyright-safe-harbor-failed.htm; Eric Goldman, Want to End the Litigation Epidemic?  
Create Lawsuit-Free Zones, FORBES (Apr. 10, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ericgoldman/2013/04/10/want-to-end-the-litigation-epidemic-create-lawsuit-free-zones. 
 52. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021−22 (9th Cir. 
2013); DMCA Conference Report, supra note 50, at 72.  See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing 
Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without 
Responsibility:  Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110 (2008). 
 53. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 54. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  The DMCA limits service provider liability for linking, caching, 
transmission and storage of content at a user’s direction, as long as the service provider qualifies as such 
and satisfies other requirements of the statute.  See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 26−28. 
 55. See Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1020−23; Viacom, 676 F.3d at 30−32. 
 56. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31.  This so-called “red-flag” knowledge, like actual, subjective 
knowledge, triggers the intermediary’s obligation to remove or disable infringing content.  Id.; see also 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 57. See Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34−35.  “Willful blindness” does not appear in the DMCA; the 
Second Circuit imported it from the common law.  See id. at 35 (“Because the [DMCA] does not speak 
directly to the willful blindness doctrine, [17 U.S.C. § 512(m)] limits—but does not abrogate—the 
doctrine.  Accordingly, we hold that the willful blindness doctrine may be applied . . . to demonstrate 
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.”).  Because the DMCA 
explicitly rules out any obligation to monitor or search for infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 512(m), willful 
blindness cannot result from a failure to act; it can occur only when an intermediary makes a “deliberate 
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willful blindness doctrine nor the “red flag” knowledge principle requires the 
intermediary to take affirmative steps to monitor or seek out infringement.58 
This contextualized, fact-specific approach to knowledge no doubt reduces the 
power of the DMCA safe harbor.  In particular, as Eric Goldman has pointed out, 
the “red flag” knowledge and willful blindness doctrines can prolong litigation and 
draw out discovery, which can drain the resources of upstart intermediaries.59  
Substantively, however, these doctrines have understandable appeal for a Congress 
and courts seeking a balanced approach to intermediary responsibility.  Even if 
copyright holders ordinarily have the burden of detecting and giving notice of 
infringement, when an intermediary has specific knowledge of a blatant act of 
infringement, it seems reasonable and cost-effective to require it to act without 
waiting for a formal notice.  And if courts limit “red-flag” knowledge to such 
unequivocal infringement, they will preserve the Netcom notion of plausible 
deniability.60  Intermediaries who learn of allegedly infringing behavior but make a 
reasonable determination that the behavior is protected by fair use, for example, 
have room to argue that the infringement would not have been “obvious” to a 
reasonable person.61 
When combined with the non-interference principle, the reasonableness 
principle suggests that rules of intermediary liability should encourage reasonable 
response to known wrongdoing, without burdening other socially valuable uses of 
online technologies. 
* * * 
These three core principles—non-interference, fault and reasonableness of 
response—have shaped the rules of secondary liability in copyright and trademark 
law.  Courts have refused to impose ex ante obligations on intermediaries to 
prevent infringement because of concerns about collateral effects,62 but they have 
not hesitated to single out deliberate wrongdoers or those who fail to act 
responsibly in responding to known infringement.  As the above discussion 
demonstrates, the limitations built into copyright and trademark’s secondary 
 
effort to avoid guilty knowledge.”  Viacom, 676 F.3d at 35 (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 
F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 58. Id.  
 59. See Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital:  A Cautionary Tale of Rightsowner 
Overzealousness, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2011, 8:19 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org 
/archives/2011/12/umg_v_shelter_c.htm.  Specifically, Goldman notes that because internal and third 
party communications can establish red flag knowledge, plaintiffs can drain defendants’ resources by 
seeking discovery of voluminous communications between the intermediary and its users.  See id. 
(pointing out that, despite its win in court, the video-streaming service Veoh ran out of money:  “This 
case’s real result is that Veoh is legal, but Veoh is dead—killed by rightsowner lawfare that bled it 
dry.”). 
 60. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 61. Any notice of infringement emanating from the copyright holder itself, of course, must satisfy 
the formal notice requirements in the DMCA, to avoid unraveling the statutory process.  See UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1024−25 (9th Cir. 2013).  See 
generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (DMCA’s formal notice requirements). 
 62. See, e.g., Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375. 
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liability standards are neither accidental nor anachronistic; to the contrary, they 
reflect a normative commitment to distinguishing between those who engage in 
behavior that is itself harmful and those whose wrong lies in enabling someone 
else’s harmful acts.  Unless these facilitators act with illicit purpose, the law limits 
their obligation to snuffing out particular instances of infringement, in order to 
preserve their ability to help legitimate actors.  This limitation is intended to ensure 
public access to technology and intellectual property for socially valuable, non-
infringing uses. 
II.  CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND THE 
INTERNET 
Given the apparently narrow standard of Inwood, there was some fear among 
scholars that dealing with online intermediaries under standards of contributory, 
rather than direct, infringement would effectively provide them immunity in 
trademark suits.63  At the other extreme, some (including this author) feared that 
aggressive liability standards in trademark law would hobble Internet commerce.64  
Contributory trademark doctrine, however, gives courts adequate tools to balance 
the core principles of intermediary liability.  On the one hand, it promises 
meaningful—”not merely symbolic”65—protection for trademark holders who 
identify abuses of their trademarks online.66  On the other hand, by focusing on 
known acts of infringement, contributory infringement doctrine seeks to avoid 
interference with legitimate trade, including legal and information-disseminating 
uses of trademarks.  Of course, trademark holders would prefer a standard requiring 
more aggressive policing by intermediaries,67 and intermediaries fear the costs of 
responding to notice of infringement.68  But the standard emerging in the case law 
suggests that courts are groping toward a reasonable balance.  While courts may 
 
 63. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:  Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2007) (suggesting that rejecting direct infringement 
claims against those who facilitated infringement would result in “immunity” for search engines and 
other online intermediaries). 
 64. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through 
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2007) (warning of “a world in which intermediaries, for 
fear of liability, fail to use consumer-generated trademark signals at all in designing their business 
models”). 
 65. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 66. See generally Thomas C. Rubin, Leveraging Notice and Takedown to Address Trademark 
Infringement Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 581 (2014) (explaining that IP owners are in the best 
position to identify infringement of their rights). 
 67. So would some scholars.  See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online 
Trademark Infringement:  The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463 (2014) (describing 
courts’ current approach to contributory trademark infringement as “wooden” and “binary,” and arguing 
in favor of a full “least cost avoider” approach). 
 68. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., THE IMPACT OF TRADE AGREEMENTS ON INNOVATION, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY:  INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ SAFE HARBORS AND 
LIABILITY 3 (2012), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ISPLiability_FNL.pdf (noting that “Internet 
intermediaries often do not have the legal resources to review takedown notices” and that “the cost of 
compliance means that most Internet intermediaries are not able to bear the costs of hosting critical or 
unpopular content”). 
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not dictate design choices or require affirmative policing, they will take the 
“reasonableness” principle seriously in assessing intermediaries’ response to notice 
of infringement.  And though this reactive approach may appear, at first glance, to 
be a “wooden” application of the non-interference principle,69 it may well prove to 
be an optimal allocation of enforcement efforts between intellectual property 
holders and intermediaries.70 
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc. is the seminal example.71  Tiffany sued eBay for 
its failure to stop the widespread counterfeit sales of Tiffany jewelry on eBay’s 
auction site.  Tiffany’s theory was contributory infringement, i.e., that eBay either 
knew or should have known “that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold 
ubiquitously on its website,” but nonetheless “continued to make its services 
available to infringing sellers.”72  eBay, in turn, pointed to its elaborate system for 
receiving and responding to notices of counterfeit goods sold on its service.73  In 
eBay’s view, Inwood limited liability to those who knowingly facilitated particular 
instances of infringement.74  Because eBay itself took swift action upon receiving 
specific knowledge of counterfeit auctions, such a standard would preclude liability 
against it. 
Both the district court and the Second Circuit agreed with eBay’s interpretation 
of Inwood and its application to the facts of the Tiffany case.75  On its face, the 
Second Circuit’s analysis of contributory infringement looks like a rote application 
of Inwood, without much normative inquiry.  After reciting the legal standard, the 
court quoted Sony as endorsing an individual acts-based interpretation of Inwood.76  
Having determined, as a matter of doctrine, that Inwood limits liability to parties 
who know of specific acts of infringement,77 the court easily concluded that 
Tiffany had failed to make its case.78  At least in the contributory infringement 
portion of its opinion, the court avoided any discussion of reasonableness or 
whether eBay had an obligation to run its operations responsibly. 
The full opinion, however, reveals a more nuanced and contextual analysis of 
eBay’s reasonableness, not only in responding to infringement, but also in opening 
itself to knowledge of it.  After rejecting the contributory infringement claim under 
the Inwood standard, the court considered Tiffany’s alternative argument, that eBay 
should face liability for willfully blinding itself to the pervasive counterfeit sales.79  
 
 69. See Dinwoodie, supra note 67. 
 70. See Rubin, supra note 66. 
 71. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 72. Id. at 106. 
 73. Id. at 109. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 107; see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 76. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 108 (noting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Inwood as applying 
to one who either “intentionally induce[s] . . . customers to make infringing uses” of its technologies, or 
who “suppl[ies] its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaged in continuing 
infringement” (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 
(1984)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Or, of course, those who induce the third party infringement.  Id. at 106. 
 78. Id. at 109. 
 79. Id. at 109–10. 
(2) 37.4 DOGAN (DO NOT DELETE) 9/22/2014  2:44 PM 
2014] PRINCIPLED STANDARDS VS. BOUNDLESS DISCRETION 515 
The court agreed with Tiffany that willful blindness could constitute “knowledge” 
for purposes of contributory infringement, but found willful blindness absent in this 
case.80  More specifically, the court upheld the district court’s factual finding 
regarding willful blindness, which itself was based on a detailed examination of the 
efforts that eBay made to root out counterfeit auctions.81  While rejecting the notion 
that eBay had an obligation to “ferret out” infringement, the district court opinion 
was rife with images of eBay’s reasonableness in making such ferreting-out 
possible.82  The district court opinion thus suggested—without holding—that 
eBay’s generalized knowledge of widespread counterfeiting required it to do 
something to facilitate the detection and removal of counterfeit goods.  The 
problem with Tiffany’s argument was that eBay had done something; indeed, it had 
done a lot: 
[T]he evidence establishes that when eBay had general knowledge of counterfeiting 
on its website, it took reasonable steps to investigate and stop that wrongdoing 
through general anti-fraud measures.  Indeed, eBay has invested significant financial, 
technological, and personnel resources in developing tools to ferret out and eliminate 
counterfeit goods from its website.83 
In retrospect, Tiffany was an easy case.  eBay not only responded to proven 
cases of infringement, but also took preemptive efforts to thwart counterfeit sales 
on its site.  If efforts like those were required to avoid a finding of willful 
blindness, smaller intermediaries could never survive an infringement suit.  The 
Second Circuit’s opinion, however, stopped short of defining willful blindness in 
this way.  As in the copyright context, the court made clear that generalized 
knowledge of infringement does not make an intermediary willfully blind.  Willful 
blindness, instead, requires deliberate avoidance of knowledge of infringement.84  
eBay’s own actions were almost certainly sufficient, but not necessary, to avoid 
liability. 
Tiffany promotes the core principles of secondary liability in intellectual 
property law.  It does not simply immunize intermediaries; to the contrary, its 
willful blindness analysis suggests that intermediaries who actively avoid 
knowledge of infringement face a real risk of liability.  The law thus promotes 
reasonableness in intermediary operations.85  But it stops short of imposing 
 
 80. Id. at 109. 
 81. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 515. 
 84. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109−10 (suggesting that if eBay had “intentionally shielded itself from 
discovering the offending listings or the identity of the sellers behind them, eBay might very well have 
been charged with knowledge”); id. (“When [a service provider] has reason to suspect that users of its 
service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular infringing 
transactions by looking the other way.”). 
 85. “Reasonableness,” of course, does not require the intermediary to do the impossible, and 
courts have made clear that contributory infringement defendants must have “sufficient control over the 
infringing activity to merit liability.”  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 
228, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 471 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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requirements that might interfere with legitimate use of technology or, indeed, of 
trademarks.  By limiting enforcement responsibilities to known instances of 
infringement, the opinion allows resellers and others to make legal, information 
disseminating uses of marks.86  In so doing, it leaves open the possibility of fault-
based liability against intermediaries who deliberately enable another party’s 
infringement. 
Other opinions follow a similar contextual analysis of contributory infringement, 
refusing to find liability that might interfere with legitimate operations but 
imposing it against parties that appear eager to promote or ignore infringement.  
For example, the Southern District of New York found contributory liability 
against a credit card company that, even after receiving a copy of a legal complaint 
of counterfeiting, continued to provide credit card services to the counterfeiter.87  
The Fourth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment for Google, based on 
evidence that the search engine had allowed “known infringers and counterfeiters” 
to continue to use its keyword-based advertising service.88  The Northern District 
of New York allowed a claim alleging that a party “offer[ed] licensing rights to 
images containing [plaintiff’s trademarks], despite knowing that the images 
constituted [trademark] infringement.”89  In another case, the Southern District of 
New York rejected a contributory infringement claim against Amazon.com, when 
Amazon had “specifically sought to bar” the defendant “from infringing on the 
trademarks of third parties.”90  Moreover, after receiving specific notice, Amazon 
had “promptly initiated enforcement action against [the direct infringer] and 
eventually terminated its contractual relationship with the company in large part 
because it continued to infringe on plaintiff’s mark.”91 
Finally, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., while not a traditional Internet 
intermediary case, further demonstrates the importance of reasonableness and 
context in contributory trademark infringement standards.92  The case involved 
allegations that one of Lens.com’s affiliates had placed confusing ads using 1-800 
Contacts’ trademarks as keywords.93  1-800 Contacts sued Lens.com for 
contributory infringement, claiming that it knew of its affiliate’s infringement and 
failed “to make reasonable efforts to halt the affiliate’s practice.”94  Lens.com 
 
 86. Cf. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 (in discussing direct infringement claims against eBay, finding no 
liability because “eBay used the [Tiffany] mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered 
for sale on its website”); id. at 103 (“To impose liability because eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness 
of all of the purported Tiffany products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful resale of 
genuine Tiffany goods.”). 
 87. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong, No. 11 Civ. 2183(GBD)(FM), 2013 WL 4046380, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (noting evidence that the defendant “had knowledge that [their clients] traded 
in counterfeit products, or was willfully blind to that fact”); see also Gucci, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 249. 
 88. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 163–65 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 89. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 90. Sellify, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10268, 2010 WL 4455830, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 4, 2010). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 93. Id. at 1237. 
 94. Id. at 1252. 
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appeared not to have known about the infringement initially, but on receiving the 
complaint, it could hardly deny general notice of the confusing ads.95  Lens.com, 
however, contended that this general notice failed to satisfy Inwood, because 
Lens.com had no knowledge of which of its more than 10,000 affiliates had placed 
the offending ads.96  Under a wooden application of Inwood, Lens.com would 
appear to have the better argument.  The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected this 
reading of the precedent, in an opinion that—for the first time—explained the 
specific-notice requirement as an attempt to reconcile the principles of non-
interference and reasonableness: 
The obvious rationale for ordinarily requiring that the defendant know the identity of 
the infringer is that otherwise the defendant could not halt the infringement without 
also stopping perfectly proper conduct—throwing the baby out with the bath water, so 
to speak.  But what if, as argued in the case before us, the defendant need not know 
the identity of the infringer to stop the allegedly infringing practice without affecting 
legitimate conduct?  We do not infer from Rosetta Stone and Tiffany that either court 
would have required knowledge of the particular offender to impose contributory 
liability in such a situation.97 
Inwood’s specific-knowledge requirement, in other words, exists to protect the 
rights of non-infringers to engage in lawful uses of marks—and the right of 
intermediaries to help them.  On the other hand, if the intermediary can cut off the 
offending conduct without substantially impairing lawful use, then the 
reasonableness principle suggests that it should do so.  In 1-800 Contacts, the facts 
suggested that Lens.com could have prevented the ongoing infringement simply by 
sending an email blast to its network of affiliates.98  Absent such an attempt, the 
court held that “a reasonable jury could find that during the period between the 
filing of [the] complaint and Lens.com’s corrective action, Lens.com knew that at 
least one of its affiliates was publishing an ad bearing 1-800 Contact’s mark, yet it 
did not take reasonable action to promptly halt the practice.”99 
Together, these cases reveal contributory infringement as a flexible doctrine 
designed to promote the core principles of secondary liability.  Its inducement 
branch assures liability for culpable parties.  For others—those whose acts create a 
risk of wrongdoing but who are not wrong themselves—the doctrine takes a 
contextualized approach to determining what they knew and what they could do 
with their knowledge.  Consistent with the non-interference principle, the doctrine 
ordinarily limits liability to those who know of specific acts of infringement and 
fail to use the tools at their disposal to stop it.  However, the concept of willful 
blindness, paired with the “reasonable response” analysis in 1-800-Contacts, 
together suggest that even those with only generalized knowledge of infringement 
have a duty not to structure their business to avoid knowledge of infringement, and 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1254. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1254–55 (emphasis added). 
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to act responsibly in stopping known, specific infringing acts.  The contributory 
infringement standard in Inwood, complemented by a robust doctrine of willful 
blindness, thus offers a balanced and normatively grounded approach to 
intermediary liability online. 
III.  DIRECT INFRINGEMENT 
Unlike the carefully calibrated balance in contributory infringement doctrine, 
direct infringement claims against intermediaries lack the normative coherence that 
might both justify them and define their limits.  Given the paucity of opinions 
discussing this type of claim and the flimsiness of theses opinions’ analyses, it may 
be premature to fret about the doctrine.  The two recent opinions that have endorsed 
direct infringement claims,100 however, give reason to worry that direct 
infringement could disturb the balance between culpability, reasonable response 
and non-interference—a balance that is critical to distinguishing between 
wrongdoing and risk creation, and thus ensuring the availability of trademarks and 
technologies for information-facilitating, non-infringing use. 
The first opinion, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., involved claims against 
Google based on its keyword advertising program, which allows advertisers to 
place ads keyed to trademarks as search terms.101  The plaintiff had alleged that 
Google’s use of Rescuecom’s marks in this program caused a likelihood of 
confusion, “in that would-be purchasers (or explorers) of its services who search 
for its website on Google are misleadingly directed to the ads and websites of its 
competitors in a manner which leads them to believe mistakenly that these ads or 
websites are sponsored by, or affiliated with Rescuecom.”102  Because Google 
enabled this potential confusion, the court suggested it could face liability as an 
infringer.103 
Rescuecom did not define the scope and contours of Google’s potential direct 
liability based on keyword ads.  The above language suggests that Google could 
face liability even if it was the advertiser itself that sowed confusion through a 
misleading ad.  The court, however, indicated that its primary concern was whether 
Google itself was creating confusion by obfuscating the difference between 
advertisements and search results: 
[Confusion] is particularly [likely], Rescuecom alleges, when the advertiser’s link 
appears in a horizontal band at the top of the list of search results in a manner which 
makes it appear to be the most relevant search result and not an advertisement.  What 
Rescuecom alleges is that by the manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of 
competing brands in response to a search for Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails 
 
 100. See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); Rescuecom Corp. v. 
Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).  A third, earlier opinion, Playboy v. Netscape, dodged the 
question of whether to apply direct or contributory infringement standards to a trademark holder’s 
claims against a search engine based on the use of its mark in keyword-based advertisements.  See 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 101. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 125–27. 
 102. Id. at 130–31. 
 103. Id. at 130. 
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adequately to identify the sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant 
search result), Google creates a likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks.  If 
the searcher sees a different brand name as the top entry in response to the search for 
“Rescuecom,” the searcher is likely to believe mistakenly that the different name 
which appears is affiliated with the brand name sought in the search and will not 
suspect, because the fact is not adequately signaled by Google’s presentation, that this 
is not the most relevant response to the search.104 
I have elsewhere advocated a reading of Rescuecom that would limit Google’s 
liability to confusion caused by its presentation of the search results page, rather 
than the content of particular ads.105  Yet the opinion does not specifically limit 
itself to that context.  By allowing a claim against Google based on its “use” of 
marks to sell advertisements, and by defining confusion by reference to the 
consumer’s response to particular ads, the court leaves open the possibility of a 
direct claim against Google for confusion caused by advertisers.106  Indeed, the 
court appeared convinced that it needed direct infringement doctrine to address the 
risk of inducement:  “If we were to adopt Google’s and its amici’s argument, the 
operators of search engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to 
deceive and cause confusion.”107  Under Inwood, however, such use of trademarks 
would easily satisfy the inducement standard, and therefore direct infringement is 
unnecessary.108 
If Rescuecom is limited to its facts—the allegations that Google confused 
consumers through placement of ads and search results—then it represents an 
aberrational but probably harmless use of the doctrine of direct infringement.  If, 
however, future courts interpret Rescuecom to allow direct infringement claims 
against intermediaries based on confusion sowed by their users, then this new form 
of direct infringement would conflict directly with the non-interference rule.  It is 
beyond question by now that trademark-focused keyword advertising has many 
lawful applications—for example, to call attention to competing products, 
complementary products, used products, criticisms or third-party reviews.  By 
finding an intermediary liable for particular confusing ads, without prior notice, the 
law would inevitably burden such legitimate speech. 
Given this risk and the inconsistency of such a reading with Tiffany (also a 
Second Circuit opinion), Rescuecom may well be limited to its facts.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s direct infringement analysis in Rosetta Stone, however, is harder to 
cabin.109  In that case, the plaintiff charged Google with direct infringement based 
on a 2009 policy change, in which Google decided to allow the use of trademarks 
in the text of keyword-generated ads.110  The evidence suggested that, at the time of 
 
 104. Id. at 131. 
 105. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It,” supra note 30, at ¶ 20 (“Direct liability required 
Google itself to engage in consumer manipulation.”). 
 106. Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131–32. 
 107. Id. at 130. 
 108. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 852–54 (1982). 
 109. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 144 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 110. Id. at 151–52.  From 2004 until 2009, Google allowed keyword-based advertising but 
prohibited the unauthorized use of trademarks in ads themselves.  Before 2004, Google’s policy 
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the policy change, Google knew that confusion could result from the use of 
trademarks in ads.111  In fact, a number of counterfeiters had misused the policy to 
advertise counterfeit Rosetta Stone software.112  Yet undoubtedly, the policy 
change also enabled perfectly lawful and informative ads, such as advertisements 
for used versions of the expensive software.113  Google’s new policy, in other 
words, was not in itself illegal or confusing; like other “mixed-use” acts and 
products, it created a risk that third parties might misuse it in infringing ways. 
Because of the mixed-use nature of Google’s service and its secondary role in 
enabling infringement, the principles of secondary liability have obvious salience.  
The non-interference principle has special relevance, given the public’s interest in 
access to trademarks for informational and other uses.  Yet the Fourth Circuit 
ignored those principles and undertook a bizarre, truncated analysis of the 
“likelihood of confusion” factors used in analyzing direct infringement claims.114  
Most of these factors, of course, made no sense in a suit against a search engine.  
Google’s use of the Rosetta Stone mark, the court found, was largely nominative, 
meaning that factors such as the strength of the mark and similarity between the 
marks were “clearly of limited value.”115  Moreover, because Google did not itself 
offer products or services under the mark, several additional factors, including 
similarity in products or services, quality of products and similarities in sales 
channels and advertising, were also irrelevant.116 
After finding almost all of the likelihood of confusion factors inapt, the court 
was left with only three plausible candidates:  intent, actual confusion and 
consumer sophistication.117  The court’s analysis of these factors suggests that 
direct infringement could turn into an exercise in bare fact finder discretion, which 
could jeopardize or undo the calibration achieved in the contributory infringement 
context.  On intent, the court concluded that a reasonable fact finder could find that 
Google “intended to cause confusion in that it acted with the knowledge that 
confusion was very likely to result from its use of the marks.”118  This is like saying 
that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Sony had intended to cause 
copyright infringement because it knew that some home tapers would use its 
machine to infringe.  Google’s policy change did not create confusion; it enabled 
 
“precluded both the use of trademarks in the text of an advertisement and the use of trademarks as 
keywords upon the request of the trademark holder.”  Id.  
 111. See id. at 156. 
 112. Id. at 152. 
 113. See Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128–29 (1947) (allowing use of 
original manufacturer’s trademarks in connection with the sale of used or reconditioned goods).  
Google’s policy specifically allowed the use of trademarks in the text of ads in four contexts:  “(1) the 
sponsor is a reseller of a genuine trademarked product; (2) the sponsor makes or sells component parts 
for a trademarked product; (3) the sponsor offers compatible parts or goods for use with the trademarked 
product or (4) the sponsor provides information about or reviews a trademarked product.”  Rosetta 
Stone, 676 F.3d at 151–52.  All of these, of course, constitute lawful uses of third-party marks. 
 114. Id. at 154–56. 
 115. Id. at 154. 
 116. Id. at 155.  
 117. Id. at 153–56. 
 118. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).  
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others (including sellers of counterfeit Rosetta Stone products) to do so.  The fact 
that Google knew that some of its advertisers would abuse its advertising policies 
does not mean that it intended them to do so, any more than the defendants in 
Tiffany and Sony intended to cause infringement.  Google’s knowledge went to risk 
of confusion, not certainty; both Sony and Inwood proscribe liability under those 
circumstances.119  The court’s analysis of intent flatly violated the non-interference 
principle. 
The court’s conflation of Google’s and its advertisers’ acts in its actual 
confusion analysis is equally problematic.  In considering whether consumers were 
actually confused, the court did not look at Google’s ad policy across the board to 
determine whether trademarks in ad text consistently caused confusion.  Instead, 
the court looked only at counterfeit ads, and thus attributed to Google the confusion 
created by counterfeit sellers, who were acting in violation of Google’s ad 
policy.120  Again, Google’s ad policy may well have created a risk that this 
wrongdoing would occur, but it was the ads—not the policy—that led to deception 
of consumers.  Like the auction site in Tiffany v. eBay and the VCR in Sony, the 
policy enabled both legitimate and illegitimate uses and therefore did not alone 
cause the “actual confusion” related to the counterfeit ads. 
I do not mean to suggest that Google should be immune from liability for 
confusion caused by advertisements for counterfeit products.  If Google knows of a 
particular advertisement that is hawking counterfeit goods, it has an obligation to 
disable access to that ad.  More generally, Google has a responsibility to keep its 
eyes open to evidence of actual counterfeit advertisements and sales.  Yet these 
obligations go to its responsibility to help police another party’s wrongdoing; they 
have nothing to do with whether Google committed a wrongdoing itself by 
allowing advertisers to use trademarks in the text of ads.  Its policy has important 
informational value to consumers, because it enables them to find used, 
reconditioned and compatible products.  By holding that a jury could find that 
Google had intentionally created confusion through its policy, the court conflated 
questions of risk and wrongdoing, and violated the core principles of secondary 
liability. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Given the interests at stake in intermediary liability cases, courts must take care 
to preserve the careful balance between non-interference, culpability and 
reasonableness.  As the Supreme Court has made clear, special rules apply to 
parties who do not themselves violate intellectual property rights, but who facilitate 
others’ infringement.  In evaluating their liability, courts must take care not to 
 
 119. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439–42 (1984); Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982). 
 120. The evidence of actual confusion consisted of:  (1) consumer testimony; (2) an expert report; 
(3) Google documents and (4) testimony suggesting that Google’s own employees could not tell the 
difference between ads for genuine and for counterfeit Rosetta Stone products.  See Rosetta Stone Ltd., 
676 F.3d at 156–59. 
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interfere with legitimate commerce, including legal and information-disseminating 
uses of protected trademarks. 
If, as seems likely, direct infringement claims against intermediaries are here to 
stay, courts must take care to distinguish between behavior that is harmful in itself, 
and behavior that increases the risk of wrongdoing by others.  If, as in Rosetta 
Stone, a policy change by an intermediary increases the risk of infringement but 
also creates possibilities for non-infringing use, it must be evaluated under 
standards of contributory infringement and principles of secondary liability.  Direct 
infringement claims should be reserved for behavior that on its own creates the 
harm that the law seeks to avoid.  While a narrow reading of Rescuecom is 
consistent with that treatment, Rosetta Stone is not.  Courts should restore the law 
of intermediary liability to a system of principled standards, rather than leaving 
boundless discretion to fact finders. 
 
